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TRADE POLICY HARMONIZATION:
TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING?
JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI & ROBERT E. HUDEC, FAIR 'TRADE AND HARMONI-

Cambridge, Mass., London: The
MIT Press, 1996 (2 Volumes). Vol. 1: Economic Analysis, xi + 598 pp. Vol. 2:
ZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?

Legal Analysis, 492 pp.
Reviewed by Alexander W. Sierck *
In seeking to resolve political, economic, and social concerns,
Americans aspire to achieve fairness. And they do so with an almost
religious intensity that is unique to the American character. While
Americans often disagree as to what fairness means in a particular
context, as the debates over affirmative action illustrate, they still insist
that fairness ought to be the touchstone of public policy.
It was thus inevitable that notions of fairness would permeate the
debates over our nation's international trade policy. Fairness in this
context is often colloquially expressed as the need for the United States
to be on a level playing field with its trading partners. A less hackneyed
variation of the same concept is expressed in terms of the need to harmonize nations' differing economic regimes. As a guide for putting these
concepts into practice, most Americans would, however, confidently

assert that others should simply be more like us.
That our trade policy focuses on this intuitive notion of fairness,
rather than on economic efficiency, vexes American economists and
others as well. Although they do not oppose fairness as such, they
believe that most people in the United States, and certainly those in
government, have not rigorously analyzed how this notion of fairness
impinges on particular international trade policy issues.
It is in this broad, important context that all who are interested in
U.S. trade policy should applaud the superb two-volume collection of
essays, Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisitesfor Free Trade?,
edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec. Bhagwati, a professor of economics and political science at Columbia University, and

Hudec, a law professor at the University of Minnesota, both rank among
the most distinguished trade policy analysts in the United States, and
both are perceptive and forceful advocates of what in political arenas is
* Partner, Cameron & Hornbostel L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; Director of Trade Policy,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice (1978-1980); LL.B., University of Virginia School
of Law (1965); B.A., University of Virginia (1962).
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called the "free" trade side of the debate. To their great credit, however,
the book they edited is not a polemic, but rather a scholarly and sympathetic assessment of the political, social and even cultural sensibilities
that give rise to calls for harmonization of national regulatory and
economic policy schemes. In other words, this assessment responds to
these calls for others to be more like us.
Bhagwati and Hudec have collected and sometimes written a series
of essays, each a separate chapter and all with comprehensive endnotes,
which are published in two companion volumes, one on the economic
issues and the other on the legal issues involved in the harmonization
debate. The essays are uniformly clear and concise.
Essays in each volume often address the same harmonization issue,
such as the competitive implications of nations' having different environmental regulatory regimes, from either the economic or legal
perspective. The editors properly acknowledge the substantial overlap
between these two perspectives, as well as the utility of reading the two
volumes by topic rather than sequentially. The two volumes provide an
extraordinary reference source for the scholar or the practitioner seeking
sophisticated but concise analyses of the origins and consequences of
various trade policy issues.
In essence, the two volumes cover four different major harmonization issues: environment, labor, unfair pricing, and market access. To
gain a full appreciation of the extraordinary merit of the two volumes, it
is worthwhile to examine how some of the authors assessed each of
these four harmonization issues, particularly from the legal perspective.
Such an examination also reveals how the fairness debate plays out in
each setting, both in how to define an unfair trade practice and what to
do when one is found to exist.

ENVIRONMENT

Some economists doubt the wisdom of imposing uniform standards
of production by means of international environmental agreements. But
because there continues to be strong public sentiment for many more
such agreements, it is important first to consider their trade policy
implications. According to Professor Hudec, the current trade-andenvironment debate involves three distinct areas of potential conflict
between trade and environmental policies. Each presents its own fairness
issue.
The first area of conflict arises either when domestic environmental
regulations overtly discriminate against imports or when they have a
manifestly burdensome impact on imports. If the burdensome impact of
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those environmental regulations cannot be justified by some credible
regulatory purpose, they can be attacked as trade barriers that violate
GA'TI/WTO obligations. For example, one country's food safety regulations can be seen by others as blatant protectionism. In a case presenting
this very issue, the United States recently obtained a favorable interim
ruling from a WTO panel in its challenge to the EU's prohibition of
imports of hormone-enhanced beef' Over time, WTO review of various
nations' health and safety regulations will surely produce some desirable
harmonization in this area.
The second area of conflict can arise if countries with more rigorous
environmental policies seek to "level the playing field" by imposing
some kind of offsetting trade restriction, such as a countervailing (antisubsidy) duty, against goods from countries with less rigorous, and
hence less costly, environmental policies. For example, U.S. producers
often raise this prospect, so far without success, with respect to imports
from Mexico and China, among other countries. To these U.S. producers, it is simply not fair that their foreign competitors incur far fewer
environmental regulatory costs than they do.
To U.S. labor leaders, lax environmental regulatory enforcement in
developing countries appears to be one more reason why United Statesbased multinationals are shifting production from the United States to
such countries. But one of the essayists, the economist John Douglas
Wilson, after examining several economic models and hypotheses,
questions whether lax environmental regulation in and of itself acts as a
magnet for foreign investment.2 Rather, Wilson maintains that direct
subsidies and tax breaks are more frequently and efficiently employed to
attract or retain investment. He concludes that developed countries need
not dismantle their environmental regulations to preserve their manufacturing base.
In any event, there is nothing in the GATT/WTO Code on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Code) that authorizes the imposition of penalty duties to offset the failure of an exporter to impose
rigorous environmental regulations. The SCM Code does, however,
specifically permit governments to subsidize a modest percentage of the
1. See Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Issues Ruling Backing U.S. Claim EU Ban on Beef Imports, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 20, at 873 (May 15, 1997). The panel's ostensibly

confidential interim ruling found that the EU's import ban violated the WTO Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, among others. Essentially, restrictions imposed on imports for health and safety reasons must be based on "sound science" and

"not on socio-economic factors."
2. See, John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There
a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 393
(Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
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cost of compliance with environmental regulations.' This allowance, as
a political as well as a legal matter, probably neutralizes the efforts of
those seeking to countervail against countries with lax environmental
regulations.
The third area of conflict arises when one country imposes trade
restrictions against imports from another country in order to induce
producers there to correct behavior that is causing environmental
harm, regardless of whether that behavior confers an economic advantage to those foreign producers. A recent example of such a trade
restriction was the U.S. embargo on imports of tuna from countries
that allow their tuna fleets to use nets that cause the death of large
numbers of dolphins. The principal objection to such "retaliatory"
trade restrictions, as recognized in an affirmative GAIT panel finding
in the Tuna-Dolphin Case, is that the government threatening trade
retaliation is seeking to regulate external matters beyond the appropriate reach of its national power, for example, by violating bedrock
limits on the extraterrestrial reach of national law.'
This third area continues to generate the most interest among trade
policy analysts, in and out of government, as well as relentless opposition from much of the business community. This area also remains of
keen interest to environmental policy groups around the world. For
these sound reasons, Hudec pursues this area in greater detail than the
first two.
Because of the virtual certainty that there will be pressures for
more international environmental agreements with trade sanctions, the
WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment is considering
whether and how to harmonize the use of trade restrictions as enforcement mechanisms in those agreements while maintaining the
basic GATT/WTO commitment to markets open to all on equal
terms.! Three major environmental agreements currently authorize such trade restrictions, the CITES convention,6 the Montreal

3.

See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-

rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,

art. 8.2(c), LEGAL

INSTRUMENTs-RESULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994) [hereinafter, Marrakesh

Agreement].
4. See United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D.
(39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), implicating the International Dolphin Conservatory Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Stat. 3425 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1417 (Supp. 1992)).
5. See, e.g., New OrganizationCould Work with WTO, Study Group Says, 14 Int'l Trade

Rep. (BNA) 1226 (July 16, 1997).
6. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
openedfor signatureMarch 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
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Protocol,' and the Basel Convention Hudec observes that since each
of these three agreements has been ratified by all or most of the GATT's
most powerful countries, the conditions for GATT-legal accommodation
of these agreements are quite favorable. To Hudec, the crucial issue still
to be decided is exactly what kinds of legal accommodation should be
made: What kind of international environmental agreements should be
included? What kind of trade restrictions, for what kind of purposes?
What specific form of legal accommodation is required or appropriate?
And what, if any, conditions should the GATT impose?
Even if those difficult questions are resolved, Hudec correctly notes
that there would still be a need to reconcile the GATT-legal rights of
nonsignatories with the policies being advanced by international environmental agreements. To Hudec, this is a problem that cannot be
resolved by conventional legal analysis. To be sure, if the principles of
certain environmental agreements achieved the status of generally
recognized international law, they might override GATT. But Hudec
asserts that no such status can be claimed for international environmental agreements as a class.
Instead Hudec asserts that absent a higher legal authority, the
GATTI/WTO itself is the only competent authority that can define the
status of the GATI-legal rights of its member governments. The GATT
agreement gave rise to those legal rights, and it provides no other means
to accomplish their interpretation, amendment, waiver, or abrogation. As
a result, international environmental agreements cannot in and of themselves authorize departures from GAT rules.
Hudec argues that the GATT requires a structure that permits it to
articulate its own policy toward these environmental trade measures
without ignoring the practical reality that GATT/WTO is unlikely to be
able to reverse or even modify the trade provisions of a broadly based
international environmental agreement, once ratified. Hudec suggests
that one good structure for doing so would be a legal rule that would
have two "lines." On the first line, governments acting through GATT
would draft rules which would define the appropriate compromise
between the contractual rights of GATT nonsignatories who opted out of
the environmental agreement and the protection of the environment; the
WTO would then review agreements for conformity with these rules in
the hope that the signatory governments would change the text for the
7. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, openedfor signature
Sept. 16, 1987, S.TREATY Doc. No. 100-10, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987), adjusted and amended
by S. TREATY DOc. No. 102-4, 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991).

8. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
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agreements to meet concerns raised, even though they would have no
GATr obligation to do so. On the second line, the rules would provide
an alternative procedure under which international environmental
agreements submitted by the signatory governments could receive ad
hoc GATT approval.9
After reading Hudec's splendidly reasoned analysis of the legal
framework appropriate for harmonizing international environmental
agreements with basic GATT/WTO precepts, it seems both inevitable
and just that there be more such agreements. However, the first and
fourth chapters in Volume 1, the economic section written by Bhagwati,
cause the reader to rethink settled assumptions about the desirability of
international agreements that establish environmental norms.
Who would oppose saving dolphins by imposing an embargo on
tuna caught with nets that kill dolphins? Would it not be right for the
Mexicans simply to adapt their practices to conform with American, or
multilateral norms? Bhagwati reminds us that this choice does not come
without cost, to the Mexicans or to the world. "[G]etting Mexico to
forgo the use of purse seines to catch tuna could save dolphins but
reduce productivity in the [Mexican] tuna industry and adversely affect
Mexico's growth and its capacity to generate resources to spend more on
other environmental problems."'
It does not follow, however, that Mexico would in fact spend more
on other, more important environmental problems. That uncertainty
makes it a bit harder than Bhagwati will admit for the U.S. citizen or
U.S. policymaker, or her multinational counterpart, to exercise shortterm regulatory restraint in the hope of long-term environmental welfare
gains. The same logic applies to child labor in developing countries, as
the next section of this review illustrates.

9. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures against
Foreign Environmental Practices,in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95, 125 (Jagdish N.
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). Hudec notes that "[a] model for this two-line type
of rule can be found in GATT Article XX(h), which creates an exception for GATT-illegal

trade measures imposed pursuant to obligations in international commodity agreements,
overriding the GATT rights of nonsignatories as well as signatories. The first part of Article
XX(h) sets out its own first-line criteria as to the substance, structure, and negotiating
procedure that commodity agreements must meet in order to qualify for a XX(h) exception.
The second part goes on to provide that the exception may also apply to any commodity
agreement submitted to the GATT Contracting Parties and not disapproved by them." Id.
10. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading
Nations, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 2, at 9, 16.
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LABOR
Today's impassioned discussions about workers' rights and wages in
the global economy might lead one to think that the linkage between
trade and labor issues is new. But recognition of the relationship between
the fair treatment of workers and international competitiveness, as
Virginia Leary of SUNY Buffalo Law School vividly reminds us, dates
from the concern about the conditions of workers during the Industrial
Revolution in Europe in the early nineteenth century." Even then, harmonization of national labor laws, on child labor for example, was
perceived as necessary in order to improve the condition of workers in
developed economies.
The debate is not much different today, except that its focus is
broader. The focus now is not only on preserving U.S. jobs at decent
wage levels in the face of lower-wage competition in other countries, but
also on whether workers' rights in other countries can be improved
through the use of trade sanctions even if U.S. jobs are not at stake. An
example of the latter concern is reflected in demands to ban imports of
oriental rugs made by child labor, even though there is no directly
competitive U.S. industry.
Leary notes that the founding of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919 and the ensuing adoption of multiple international
labor conventions by the ILO are seen by many as turning points in the
history of the relation between workers' rights and trade. Certainly, the
ILO has contributed to the enhancement of workers' rights (and wages)
in developed countries. But Leary still questions whether the ILO has
helped ameliorate the conditions of workers elsewhere. Of course, some
development economists ask whether and to what extent developed
countries should impose their high standards on the poorer but growing
economies of the developing world.
In its broadest terms, the labor-trade debate has generated calls for
the inclusion of a "social clause" in international trade agreements as a
means to raise wages and improve working conditions to the levels of
the advanced industrial nations. This clause would link workers' rights to
trade concessions. Proponents of the social clause argue that the export
of goods produced under exceptionally bad working conditions results in
"unfair" competition which will negatively affect the working conditions
in countries with high labor standards, resulting in a "race to the bottom"
and a deterioration of working conditions in developed countries. Other
11. See Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause
(GATT ILO, NAFTA, US. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 9, at
177, 183.
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proponents of the social clause appear primarily concerned with the
appalling working conditions in many developing countries, casting the
issue in human rights terms.
Opponents of the linkage of workers' rights and international trade
contend that imposition of labor "regulatory" costs will frustrate the
increase of exports from developing countries. They assume, often
correctly, that increasing exports is one of the best ways to improve the
economies of developing countries, and that such improvement naturally
raises labor standards. Many note the inadequacies of this laissez-faire
observation. They believe it precludes the possibility that some external
prodding, with respect to the recognition of labor unions, for example,
would accelerate improvement of working conditions without major job
losses among the poor. Instead they ask what norms the developed world
should impose on developing economies. Leary's thorough and perceptive essay helps frame answers.
Leary acknowledges that there is much confusion in the literature
concerning the meaning of such broad phrases as "internationally recognized workers' rights" and "minimal international labor standards."
Similarly, there is confusion as to which labor standards are being
referred to in the debates over linking them with trade.
Leary argues that ILO standards provide the best starting points for
defining these broad phrases because they have been accepted in a
multinational forum. The ILO has established a priority among its many
standards by referring to conventions on freedom of association and
collective bargaining, on forced labor, on equal remuneration, and on
discrimination in employment as "basic human rights conventions"2
which should be accorded priority in ratification and implementation.1
Leary notes that these conventions are the most widely ratified of all
ILO conventions and those to which the ILO devotes the most attention.
The ILO, however, is not the only appropriate source for defining
these broad phrases. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights also enshrine basic principles of workers' rights, but they do so
more extensively than the ILO. They include such broad and controversial objectives as the right to protection against unemployment and the

12. The main ILO human rights conventions are Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Abolition
of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention, 1958 (No. 111), Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, Conventions and Recommendations (1966).
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right to equal pay for equal work. 3 Most economic policymakers would
consider these objectives to be laudable goals, but if they were enacted
as binding law, they would inhibit economic growth and do more harm
than good to the very people they were intended to assist.
Do broad phrases that seek to establish "acceptable conditions of
work" require the elimination of child labor? Leary notes that, although
conventions on child labor are not included among the ILO's basic
human rights conventions, the ILO Committee of Experts has considered
certain serious cases of the use of child labor as bonded or forced labor.
Because the concept of "acceptable conditions of work" is such a broad
term, Leary believes it is nearly meaningless. But how should that
phrase be defined? For example, fourteen ILO conventions have been
adopted since 1949 on various aspects of worker safety and health.
Leary asks whether the concept of "adequate conditions of work with
respect to ...occupational safety and health" follow the detailed provisions of ILO conventions and recommendations on the subject. If not,
what criteria should be used to determine adequate standards relating to
safety and health? What are adequate "minimum wages"? To Leary and
most others, the process of determining adequate minimum wages in any
particular country or industry seems exceptionally complicated and
controversial.
Leary makes the important additional point that U.S. legislation
giving certain duty preferences to imports from the Caribbean,"' as well
as the annual State Department Reports on Human Rights, also suggest
that "internationally recognized worker rights," should be defined in
relatively broad terms. Moreover, the Clinton Administration's proposed
bill to provide Carribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiary countries
with textile and apparel export parity with NAFTA countries, would
require the CBI countries to guarantee internationally recognized workers' rights. These include "the right of association, the right to organize
and bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of any form of coerced
or compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment of children,
and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health."'5 President Clinton's
September 17, 1997 Fast-Track treaty negotiation proposal also would

13. See Leary, supra note 11, at 215.
14. The Caribbean Basin Initiative law provides that, in determining whether to grant
duty-free treatment to the country concerned, the President may take into account the extent
to which workers are afforded "reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to
organize and bargain collectively." 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8)(1994).
15. Administration Analysis of CBI Parity Bill, reprinted in AMERICAS TRADE, June 26,

1997, at 15, 16.
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require the United States to seek to establish a mechanism to report on
the extent to which ILO Member States have promoted "core labor
standards. '16
Finally, Leary notes that the Netherlands undertook an effort to define "minimum international labor standards" in the mid-1980s. Upon
request, the Netherlands National Advisory Council for Development
Cooperation advised the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation on
the feasibility of incorporating a provision concerning "minimum labor
standards" into international economic and trade agreements.
The Dutch Advisory Council's report sets an absolutist tone. It defines minimum labor standards, as those which "all countries ought to
introduce and observe under all circumstances." However, it also indicates that there are minimum standards "in a relative sense which
develop more or less in line with economic growth."'1 The Advisory
Council reviewed various ILO standards to determine which should be
incorporated in the definition of "minimum internationally recognized
labor standards." The Council's report concluded that the standards in
eight ILO conventions (two conventions on freedom of association; two
conventions on forced labor; and conventions on discrimination in
employment, equal remuneration, employment policy, and minimum age
for employment) provided the baseline regulation of international labor
practices to be incorporated in international agreements.
Leary believes this report's thoroughness and the depth of its analysis of the links between international trade and international standards
make it essential reading for those concerned with workers' rights and
trade policy. She is right because, in spite of the protests of many
economists and many business leaders, public pressure will continue to
grow for international agreements that improve workers' rights, sometimes with trade sanctions applied to governments that do not.
Workers' rights issues are perhaps even more emotional than environmental issues because of their close association with human rights
concerns. Policymakers and economists should not, therefore, underestimate the impact on U.S. and European public opinion of vivid
television images of child labor cruelties and worker safety abuses. In
the years ahead the most compelling arguments for minimum labor
rights will not be based solely on fears that imported goods from low16. See Clinton Fast-Track Bill Limits Scope of Labor Environment Rules, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 17, 1997, at S-3, S-4. It is likely that the Republican Congress will water down
this section of the Fast-Track proposal somewhat.
17. National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation, Recommendation on
Minimum International Labor Standards, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Plein 23, The Hague,
Netherlands, Nov. 1984), quoted in Leary, supra note 11, at 217.
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wage countries will destroy manufacturing jobs in high wage countries.
Rather, articulate and well-educated participants in the service sectors of
the economy, whose jobs are not directly threatened by sweatshops, are
likely to be in the vanguard of raising labor rights issues as human rights
issues.
The challenge for policymakers will be to make sure that emotional
responses to powerful images of suffering do not impose unintended
economic harm. This is why consumer boycotts alone are often not a
sufficient response to products made from sweatshop labor. Opinion
makers in the developed world need to work with international development institutions as well as developing country industries and
governments to ensure that mandates improving working conditions do
in fact improve the prospects of the wretched of the earth. For example,
raising the minimum age for child labor would be an empty gesture if
there were no schooling available for the newly liberated children. This
once again illustrates that achieving "fairness" often involves more than
the upward harmonization of standards.
UNFAIR PRICING

The controversies over what does and does not constitute anticompetitive behavior in international trade presents, at least to the
business and labor communities, one of the most impassioned manifestations of the "fairness" debates. The fundamental concern is that lowpriced products from domestic or foreign sources have the potential to
drive incumbent producers out of business. These pricing issues typically arise in two related settings: one, the antidumping and
countervailing duty (anti-subsidy) laws; and the other, the antitrust laws.
Each set of laws is concerned with unfairly low pricing, but in significantly different ways.
One of the most stimulating essays dealing with the debate in this
pricing context is provocatively titled "Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Law: The Mirage of Equitable International Competition." The
authors, Ron Cass, a former chairman of the International Trade Commission and now a law school dean and Richard Boltuck, an
international trade economist and business consultant, stress the divergence of the definitions of unfair pricing. 8 The import relief laws reflect
an international political judgment that sustained transnational price
18. See Ronald A. Cass & Richard D. Boltuck, Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty
Law.: The Mirage of Equitable International Competition, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 9, at 351.
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discrimination ought to be deterred notwithstanding the consumer
benefits of low prices. In contrast, the infrequent application of antitrust
law to deter aggressive, if not predatory, low prices reflects a classic
economic judgment that consumer welfare is best served by low prices.
This divergence is revealed most visibly in the required determination of whether the low pricing at issue is injurious. The antidumping
laws focus on the welfare of incumbent domestic producers. 9 The
antitrust laws seek to preserve the competitive process, whether the
competitors are domestic or foreign. 0 Further, the antidumping law
essentially proscribes sales below the fully allocated cost of production,2'
while antitrust law only proscribes sales below marginal or average
2
variable cost.

The antitrust laws thus recognize that price discrimination is a
commercially legitimate activity. Economists and counsel for respondents frequently criticize the antidumping laws for failing to recognize
this fact. Cass and Boltuck argue that the "fairness" ascribed to the
antidumping laws is really just a manifestation of special interest pleading by a few industries in the manufacturing sector, and that these
special interests have hijacked the emotive phrase "fair trade" for their
own unfair use. In fact, they are concerned as well that manufacturing
interests will advocate global standards of fair environmental or labor
practice simply to protect themselves from aggressive price competition
from foreign goods.
Cass and Boltuck downplay, however, a practical distinction between
geographic price discrimination in a wholly domestic context and that
occurring across national borders. In many cases involving exports from
19. In determining whether the foreign producers' U.S. sales cause or threaten to cause
intentional injury to a domestic industry, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
examines whether, among other things, the foreign producers' U.S. sales suppress the prices
of U.S. producers. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(ii). The ITC does not focus on consumer welfare.
20. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (noting "[t]hat below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is of no
moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured").
21. In determining whether and to what extent there are dumping margins, the U.S.
Commerce Department, when calculating "normal value" (usually the home market price),
must disregard sales mode in an extended record of time and in substantial quantities which
"were not at prices which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time." 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(1)(B).
22. See Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 222 (1993) (holding that below-cost pricing is
necessary to a showing of an antitrust violation). Although Brooke Group did not provide the
measure of pricing to be used in antitrust cases, most courts have adopted the marginal or
average variable cost measure. For exposition of how the circuit courts have measured belowcost pricing in antitrust cases, see 2 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 255-262 (4th ed. 1997). In any case, Brooke Group does state that pricing must
be below cost for a proper antitrust case.

Summer 1997/]

Trade Policy Harmonization

relatively closed markets, such as Japan and Brazil in the 1980s, U.S.
firms could not counter a foreign producer's extra-low prices in the U.S.
market by pricing their own exports extra-low for the putative dumper's
home market. Such tactics reduce that foreign producer's crosssubsidization of low-priced U.S. sales with high-priced home market
sales. Within the bounds of a single country, in contrast, such commercial cross-retaliation is relatively simple, and usually effective.
In free trade agreements and customs unions, where tariffs and other
trade barriers are reduced among participating countries, such as with
NAFTA, there should be no reason to maintain the antidumping remedy
as a way to deter international price discrimination because the ostensible victim of dumping can readily retaliate in the dumper's home
market. In fact, a bedrock principle of the Rome Treaty precludes the
filing of antidumping cases by producers in one EU Member State
against imports from another Member State.23 The Australia-New Zealand and Chile-Canada trade agreements have similar provisions, but
NAFTA does not.24
In any event, Cass and Boltuck argue that the antidumping laws have
always been an inappropriate response to low-priced products exported
by firms operating in closed home markets. They contend that the antidumping laws, in part by virtue of their very complexity,
overcompensate for whatever harm might be caused by the foreign
producers' low export prices. Here again frequent users of the antidumping laws, such as the steel industry in the United States, have
disproportionately influenced the administration of these laws in many
nations. Surely, this is not a desirable form of harmonization.
Cass and Boltuck's criticism of the protectionist bias of the antidumping laws is legitimate. But they do not recommend specific
reforms, perhaps because they recognize the political futility of such an
effort, particularly since many of these protectionist abuses are enshrined in the text of the GATT/WTO Antidumping Code itself.
Nor do Cass and Boltuck discuss whether, much less how, the
United States and the EU should deal with the political and economic
dilemma of the pricing of imports from non-market economies (NMEs)
such as Russia, Ukraine and China. In the United States there is an
23. See J.F Beseler and A.N. Williams, ANTIDUMPING AND ANTISUBSIDY LAW: THE
EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrIEs 21-22 (1986); Jean-Francois Bellis, The EECAntidumping System,
in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 41, 44-45 (John H. Jackson &
Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
24. See Chile/Canada, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at 308 (Feb. 19, 1997); Australia/New Zealand, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 123 (Jan. 23, 1991); North American
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1902.1, 32 I.L.M. 605, 682 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
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especially complex and unavoidably arbitrary method for constructing
an equivalent to the so-called "normal value" against which the U.S.
price is compared to determine ostensible margins of dumping by the
non-market economy producer." But in both the United States and the
EU, many cases involving low-priced non-market economy imports,
particularly those involving steel and mineral products, are settled by the
use of quotas or a combination of quotas and price floors.26 This, of
course, produces allegations of so-called "managed trade," which the
U.S. and EU governmental officials should ordinarily seek to avoid.
However, no one seems able to devise a simpler, more rational
scheme for calculating margins of "unfairly" priced NME imports; the
countervailing duty law, for example, does not apply to NME cases. Yet,
most trade lawyers, government officials, and perhaps economists, are
unwilling to permit Chinese and Russian exporters to have indiscriminate access to foreign markets.
Perhaps the answer to the NME import dilemma lies in the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards. The Agreement provides for merely temporary relief from import competition, with an eight-year maximum
duration," and allows for negotiated combinations of quotas and tariff
rises as part of relief remedy." But industries seeking relief under the
U.S. safeguards law, also known as the "escape clause" law or as a
Sections 201 proceeding,29 accurately complain that this law has a higher
injury threshold than the antidumping law, that its application is subject
to presidential veto on extraneous grounds, and that when invoked the
United States must pay "compensation" in the form of trade liberalization on other products equivalent to the amount of import trade curtailed.
Because the application of the escape clause law is inherently much less
predictable than the antidumping law, it appears for the foreseeable future
not to be a politically satisfactory substitute for the antidumping law.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c); 19 CFR § 351.408.
26. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(l); see, e.g., Antidumping; Uranium From Kazakhstan,
Kyrgystan, Russia, Tajikstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; Suspension of Investigations and
Amendment of Preliminary Determinations, 57 Fed. Reg. 49220 (1992) (price/quota provision of Russian Federation agreement at 49235-49238); Amendment to the Agreement
Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium From the Russian Federation, 59 Fed.
Reg. 15373 (1994); Amendments to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium From the Russian Federation, 61 Fed. Reg. 56665 (1996).
27. In theory an antidumping order can be revoked after five years, but only if the affected foreign producers can make the difficult evidentiary showing that the injurious
dumping is not likely to continue or recur if the order is revoked. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d).
28. Agreement on Safeguards, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3.
29. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq. The equivalent escape clause law applicable just to imports from "Communist" countries, 19 U.S.C. § 2436, is now largely irrelevant except for
China.
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In addition to their excellent analysis of the protectionist bias of the
antidumping laws, Cass and Boltuck also review the scope and application of the countervailing duty law, imposed to offset government
subsidies ° Originally designed to counter export subsidies, this law is
now more frequently used to respond to all manner of production subsidies, from regional development grants to bail-outs of failing stateowned enterprises. As with the calculation of antidumping margins, the
authors believe that U.S. officials magnify the unit value of those subsidies when calculating their offsetting margins. The difficulty these U.S.
officials encounter when establishing the economic value of the subsidy
undercuts their argument that they impose these offsetting margins to
achieve fairness. The current debate over how the U.S. Commerce
Department should determine the residual value of government subsidies
to a state-owned enterprise after it is privatized illustrates their point."
In large measure the WTO Antidumping Code and the WTO Code
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures already reflect a harmonization of laws dealing with the competition presented by low-priced
foreign goods. Additionally, more and more developing countries administer their own antidumping laws in a manner that resembles the
complex and often arbitrary U.S. process. This is hardly a commendable
form of harmonization, yet it is hard to blame developing countries for
wanting to give the United States and the EU a taste of their own medicine.
Since the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, there have been increasing calls for nations to
harmonize their antitrust and competition policy laws as well. The
United States has refused to join this chorus, rightly fearing a "dumbing
down" of its own laws, particularly as aggressively applied to prohibit
price fixing and market division and to foster competition in previously
regulated areas such as telecommunications. Interestingly, the February
15, 1997 WTO Telecoms Agreement32 for the first time incorporates
basic antitrust, pro-competitive precepts into the GAIT/WTO body of
legal norms; this may portend greater concern at the international level
over competition policy values that focus on consumer welfare. But
there is no prospect that this also portends meaningful pro-consumer
changes in either the Antidumping Code or the SCM Code.
30. See Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq.
31. See, e.g., the preamble to Commerce's proposed rules, 19 C.F.R. § 351.501 (1997);

Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 8818, 8820-8823 (1997) (to be
codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351).
32. See Summary of Country Commitments in WTO Telecommunications Talks as of Feb.
24, 1997, Prepared by USTR, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 9, at 393 (Feb. 26, 1997).
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MARKET ACCESS: THE CASE OF JAPAN

The antitrust debate arises in another important international trade
context. For at least twenty-five years some of the most contentious
trade policy debates in the United States have involved Japan, particularly the perception that Japanese governmental and business institutions
work together to keep the Japanese market relatively closed to U.S.
exports and investment. U.S. critics decry this manifest lack of reciprocity, and cite Japan's need to apply antitrust precepts as a means of
making its internal markets more competitive, and hence more receptive
to foreign goods and foreign investment. It is here that the United States
loudly and clearly says that Japan should be more American, and with
good reason.
The harsh U.S. reaction towards Japan's closed economy seems to
be subsiding, however. This is because Japan is slowly opening. But it is
also because the relative importance of Japan is declining owing to
maturation of the Japanese economy and to greater U.S. preoccupation
with China and the Asian tigers. In any event, current debates about
Japan are also important today because they inform the comparable
debates and strategies about access to China and other developing
countries reluctant to open up their markets to U.S. trade and investment.
Gary Saxonhouse and John McMillen, both noted economists, have
each written informative essays on Japan. Saxonhouse's essay reviews
the long history of unfair trade allegations against Japan, and McMillen's essay explains why Japan resists foreign market-opening pressures.
Both authors examine specific market opening issues, and both resist
easy generalizations.
Saxonhouse reviews various U.S. perceptions of Japanese trade barriers and asserts that the Japanese market is not as closed as many U.S.
policymakers think. Saxonhouse also asserts that Japan's closed market
is neither the result of illegitimate government policies nor unusual
economic institutions (a point somewhat inconsistent with his prior point
that the market is open). 3
While his conclusions remain debatable, Saxonhouse does offer
many clarifying factual conclusions, such as the erosion of ostensibly
permanent intercorporate relationships under the keiretsu system.3
McMillen likewise makes some interesting observations about this
system of relationships. He also graciously condemns the United States'

33. See Gary R. Saxonhouse, A Short Summary of the Long History of Unfair Trade Allegations againstJapan, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 2, at 393.
34. See id. at 497.
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blanket criticisms as hypocritical, in part because U.S. firms, notably in
the auto industry are adopting the same types of relationships.35
McMillen is optimistic about the future of U.S.-Japan trade relations, quoting with approval the Australian political scientist Amelia
George:
US [sic] pressure has become a powerful catalyst for change in
the Japanese economy, polity and society.... In many respects
the United States is an actor in the Japanese policy process: as a
surrogate opposition party presenting the only true set of alternative to the government's, as an interest group representing the
voice of Japanese consumers, and as an alternative powerbase
for Japanese prime minister seeking to overcome both shortfalls
in their factional strength and domestic resistance to change.36
McMillen then comments on the importance of trade liberalization
generally, and import competition in particular. Quoting Bhagwati, he
observes that most free trade works as an effective antitrust device;
allowing imports is an easy way to remove the market power of a domestic monopolist.17 And he could have added that this in turn prevents
the domestic monopolist from subsidizing low or dumped export prices
though supra-normal profits in the home market.
The discussions of market access are unfortunately somewhat outof-date even though the two volumes were published only last year.
These discussions focus on U.S. efforts to open foreign markets, particularly Japan, through the notorious unilateral Section 301 and Super
301 processes, and through numerous bilateral sectoral discussions." In
the past, one reason for the United States taking these controversial
unilateral approaches to market access issues was because there was no
remedy in practice under the GATI' system to attack governmental
policies that protected home markets from foreign competition. Specifically, the dispute resolution process in the GATT did not work, because
the losing country could block adoption of an adverse finding. This
prevented the prevailing country from withdrawing trade benefits from
the losing country, unless and until the losing country changed its practices to conform with the finding.
This all changed with the successful completion of the Uruguay
Round in 1994. Now dispute resolution resembles adjudication rather
than diplomacy. There are even mandatory decision deadlines. Losing
35. See John McMillen, Why Does Japan Resist Foreign Market-Opening Pressure, in 1
supra note 2, at 531.
36. Id. at 519.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 485-502.
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countries must now change their practices or face legitimate limited
retaliation. This retaliatory capacity should go a long way towards
resolving market access issues arising from governmental 'acts or practices.
There is, however, now pending a WTO dispute resolution proceeding brought by the United States against Japan that will test whether the
WTO dispute resolution process can be used to address the realities
behind closed markets in Japan. The proceeding raises the fundamental
question of whether Japan's failure to use its antitrust laws to break
down restrictive distribution practices in the private sector nullifies or
impairs market-liberalizing commitments, such as tariff cuts, that Japan
has made in multilateral trade negotiations.40 This is a test case in two
major respects. First, it seeks to harmonize Japanese antitrust enforcement with what occurs (or is said to occur) in the United States and the
EU. Second, and even more importantly, it directly addresses the issue of
when inaction by a government can nonetheless be actionable under
basic WTO agreements, as it surely would be under the specific regulatory precepts of the WTO Telecoms Agreement.
If the WTO panel agrees that the United States has stated a claim
that falls within the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement process,
this will be seen as a victory for the use of antitrust as a market-opening
device, whether or not the United States prevails on the actual merits of
the case. If the WTO panel refuses to hear the case, on the basis that
only non-governmental activity is at issue, then we can expect frustration if not fury from United States lawmakers that the newly improved
WTO dispute settlement process remains ineffective in dealing with
closed national markets.

CONCLUSION

Economists observe that many policies and practices labeled as unfair are in fact mislabelled or that the proposed remedies create more
problems than they solve. Thus, the economists make an essential
contribution to public policy in reminding us that our hearts often
outrun our heads, sometime with unforeseen consequences.
39. See generally Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex 2, (1994)
UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DispurEs,
Article 16, Adoption of Panel Reports.
40. The case involves the U.S. government's claim that Japan's restrictive distribution

practices has prevented Kodak from making inroads into Fuji's dominant position in the
Japanese photographic film market. See Japan Continues to Support Barriers to Foreign
Film, U.S. Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 23, at 983 (Jun. 4, 1997).
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But many economists seem to discount or ignore the value of the
debates over fairness, and even the threats to take action against it. Time
and again, the world has seen examples of countries improving their
internal laws and practices in response to public outcry sparked by
outsiders, some with very parochial interests. In any event, debate over
when and how to respond to perceived unfairness will surely continue,
and probably increase. And that is no bad thing.

